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GOOD SAMARITAN LAWS: A GLOBAL PERSPECrIVE
I. INTRODUCTION
"Good Samaritan statute. A law that requires a person to
come to the aid of another who is exposed to grave physical harm,
if there is no danger of risk of injury to the rescuer."'
In the wake of Princess Diana's death,2 the "Good Samaritan"
parable of biblical yore3 is reiterated in the backdrop of the twen-
tieth century as the world focuses again4 on the duty to assist.5 Al-
though millennia have passed, the parable remains controversial
and relevant. While international attention centers on France's
Good Samaritan statute,6 this Comment explores similar statutes
in Australia, the United States, and France.7 In particular, this
Comment considers possible criminal ramifications where a gen-
1. Black's Law Dictionary Pocket Edition 279 (1st ed. 1996).
2. See William D. Montalbano & Sarah White, Princess Diana, Friend Killed in Paris
Car Crash; Accident: Auto Goes Out of Control While Apparently Being Chased by Pho-
tographers. Driver Also Dies. Diana Was to Return to Sons Today After Vacation With
New Beau, Harrods Heir Dodi Fayed, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1997, at Al.
3. See Luke 10: 25-37.
4. A multitude of news accounts discussed possible charges involving members of
the infamous "paparazzi" for their alleged disinclination in aiding the dying Princess Di-
ana, Dodi Fayed, Henri Paul, and Trevor Rees-Jones. See, e.g., P.J. Shuey, "Good Sa-
maritan" Law Different in U.S., CAPITAL (Md.), Sept. 7, 1997, at A6; Brian A. Lapps, Sr.,
Good Samaritan Law is Worth Imitating, NASHVILLE BANNER, Sept. 5, 1997, at A22;
Dave Daley, Few Prosecuted Under State Samaritan' Law, Like France, Wisconsin Re-
quires Residents to Help Crime, Accident Victims, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Sept. 5,
1997, at 9; Mary Hynes, Nevada Has Different Rules on Rendering Aid, LAS VEGAS REV.-
J., Sept. 3, 1997, at 3A; Charles Bremner & Andrew Pierce, Princess's Driver Was Drunk,
TIMES (London), Sept. 2, 1997, at 1; Lawyers Claim It's a Witchhunt, HERALD (Glasgow),
Sept. 3, 1997, at 1; John-Thor Dahlburg, Driver in Crash Reportedly Was Legally Drunk,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1997, at Al; Mark Mueller, Princess Wore Dodi's 'Friendship' Ring,
BOSTON HERALD, Sept. 4, 1997, at 4; CNN Early Edition (CNN television broadcast,
Sept. 1, 1997).
5. This Comment uses the phrase "duty to assist" interchangeably with "Good Sa-
maritan statute" and "Good Samaritan law."
6. See CODE PtNAL [C. PaN.] art. 63 (Fr.).
7. This Comment does not consider defenses for failing to assist or the effects of
botched rescue attempts, but rather the legal impetus to assist in the first place. For an
analysis of Anglo-Canadian rescuer defenses, see Mitchell McInnes, Protecting the Good
Samaritan: Defences for the Rescuer in Anglo-Canadian Criminal Law, 36 CRIM. L.Q. 331
(1994).
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eral duty to assist is disregarded. 8
This Comment contemplates the implementation of Good
Samaritan statutes in additional United States jurisdictions by
looking at the benefits and shortcomings of current statutes. Part
II discusses the relationship between common law and civil law
systems with respect to general duties to assist. Part III discusses
Good Samaritan statutes in Australia, the United States, and
France. Finally, Part IV analyzes the controversy surrounding
Good Samaritan laws and rejects their introduction in additional
United States jurisdictions.
II. DISTINcTION BETWEEN TWO PREVAILING DERIVATIONS OF
LAW
A. Good Samaritan Statutes and the Common Law Are Not
Mutually Exclusive
There is a distinction in the prevalence of Good Samaritan
legislation between common law and civil law jurisdictions. Gen-
erally, common law jurisdictions disfavor a general duty to assist,9
whereas civil law jurisdictions prefer such a duty.1° However,
there are exceptions to this generalization.11 These exceptions
suggest that common law and Good Samaritan statutes may coex-
ist in one jurisdiction. 12
8. While civil liability in tort certainly exists for failure to assist in many instances,
an examination of criminal ramifications seems more timely and relevant in the wake of
Princess Diana's death. Accordingly, this Comment focuses on the criminal aspects of
Good Samaritan laws, with little emphasis concerning civil accountability. For a pre-
scriptive analysis of civil liability in tort based on common law principles, see John M.
Adler, Relying Upon the Reasonableness of Strangers: Some Observations About the Cur-
rent State of Common Law Affirmative Duties to Aid or Protect Others, 1991 WIS. L. REV.
867 (1991).
9. See Samuel Freeman, Criminal Liability and the Duty to Aid the Distressed, 142
U. PA. L. REV. 1455, 1456 (1994).
10. See generally F.J.M. Feldbrugge, Good and Bad Samaritans, A Comparative Sur-
vey of Criminal Law Provisions Concerning Failure to Rescue, 14 AM. J. COMP. L. 630
(1966) (explaining the duty to assist in many post-World War II European jurisdictions).
11. This Comment discusses some notable examples.
12. See Mary Ann Glendon, Does the United States Need "Good Samaritan" Laws?, 1
RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY 9, 11 (1991). Glendon states:
The notion that criminal law, in addition to all the other things it does, both re-
flects and reinforces certain basic common values of society is much more widely
accepted in the Roman-law based systems than it is in the United States and
England.... That there is nothing 'alien' to American legal values in making
the failure to come to the aid of an endangered person a criminal offense, how-




Good Samaritan laws have endured a historic legacy spanning
thousands of years. One commentator suggests that early human
civilization had a general duty to assist:
The concern of criminal law with the duty of passersby towards
other people in danger is not of this century. In ancient Egyp-
tian and Indian law there are provisions which order the pun-
ishment of those who fail to aid persons in danger. However,
Roman law and scholastic thought were unfavorably inclined
toward legislation of this nature. It is only in the nineteenth
century that a similar provision reappears, in the Russian
Criminal Code of 1845, followed by the criminal codes of Tus-
cany (1853), the Netherlands (1881), and Italy (the Zanardelli
Code of 1889). Other codes in the first half of the twentieth
century also conformed to this pattern; but it has been only
since World War II that almost every new criminal code con-
tains a failure-to-rescue provision.
13
Thus, after World War II many civil law jurisdictions introduced
Good Samaritan-type statutes.
14
Evidence of Good Samaritan statutes' widespread implemen-
tation over the last century settles questions concerning their his-
toric existence in civil law jurisdictions. Debate, however, still sur-
rounds the historic existence of a general duty to assist in common
law jurisdictions. One analyst, Steven Heyman, contends that
common law jurisdictions required a limited state-imposed duty to
assist.15 Specifically, he argues that "the traditional common law
recognized an obligation-or rather a family of related obliga-
tions-to prevent criminal violence."' 16 Police forces supplanted
ent unawareness of the fact that it thus became the first American state to take
such an approach.
Id.
13. Feldbrugge, supra note 10, at 630-31.
14. Good Samaritan laws were enacted during World War II as well. For example,
"they first became law in France in 1941 during the German occupation, partly in an at-
tempt to stem terrorism against the German army." Andrew Ashworth & Eva Steiner,
Criminal Omissions and Public Duties: the French Experience, 10 LEGAL STUD. 153, 156-
57 (1990). Thus, while the impetus to enact these statutes seems motivated by humanitar-
ian concerns, a warring country can use them to dispel unrest. This illustrates that both
altruistic and invidious concerns can motivate the implementation of Good Samaritan
statutes.
15. See Steven J. Heyman, Foundations of the Duty to Rescue, 47 VAND. L. REV. 673,
689 (1994).
16. Id. at 685. Heyman bolsters his assertion by examining several learned treatises
in addition to case law. See id. at 685-90.
5931998]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
this duty by averting criminal violence through their official ca-
pacities. 17 This duty, however, does not qualify as a general duty
to assist. A general duty to assist might, for example, encompass
the obligation to prevent criminal violence and require a passerby
to aid in the event of an accident involving no criminal act.
While most commentators do not recognize a historic general
duty to assist in the common law, they generally acknowledge a
somewhat limited duty in the context of special relationships.
18
United States early case law recognizes this special relationships
exception. 19
III. GENERAL DUTIES To ASSIST AROUND THE WORLD
A. Australia
A general duty to assist in the Commonwealth of Australia
exists only in the Northern Territory.20 It utilizes a statute that
imposes a duty to assist even in the absence of a special relation-
ship.21 A 1994 decision by the Supreme Court of the Northern
Territory clarifies the nature and purpose of the statute:
Section 155 of the Code, described by a previous Attorney-
General in the Legislative Assembly as "the Good Samaritan
provision", provides as follows: Any person who, being able to
provide rescue, resuscitation, medical treatment, first aid or
succor of any kind to a person urgently in need of it and whose
life may be endangered if it is not provided, callously fails to do
so is guilty of a crime and is liable to imprisonment for 7
years.22
Criminal Code section 155 addresses social concerns held in the
Northern Territory.23 As such, it marks a clear departure from
17. See id. at 689.
18. See id. at 675; Freeman, supra note 9, at 1456; Ann G. Sjoerdsma, Good Samari-
tan Law? Not In America. Punishing Good Deeds, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS,
Sept. 18, 1997, at A9. "A key [exception at common law] was a 'special relationship' be-
tween the victim and the would-be rescuer. Certain people have a duty of care toward
others because of their relationship, usually one of dependency: the physician toward his
patient, the shopkeeper toward his customer, the employer-employee, parent-child." Id.
19. See Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Handbook on Criminal Law § 3.3,
at 1 & nn.11, 12 & 15 (1986).
20. See THE LAWS OF AUSTRALIA, 10 CRIMINAL OFFENCES, 10.1 HOMICIDE, PART
C-OMISSIONS at 45 (John A. Riordan ed., 1996).
21. See Criminal Code Act § 155 (N. Terr. Austl.).
22. Salmon v. Chute and Dredge (1994) 4 N.T.L.R. 149, 151.
23. See id. at 160 ("Its basis lies in a concept of social responsibility").
[Vol. 20:591594
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most common law systems. 24 Salmon v. Chute clarifies this depar-
ture.2
Salmon v. Chute involved a "hit and run" automobile acci-
dent. The appellant driver struck a pedestrian child, and pro-
ceeded to drive away without rendering assistance to his victim.
26
The child died thereafter due to injuries sustained in the colli-
sion.27 Following his arrest, the appellant stated he had simply.
"panicked." 28 In a lower court, the appellant plead guilty to the
Code section 155 charge.
29
On appeal, the appellant challenged his conviction and sen-
tence under Code section 155.30 In recognizing the "novel nature
of the provision,"31 the Court divided the statute into four distinct
elements. In the words of the court:
The offence comprises [four] elements. It makes it an of-
fence for:
1. any person who, being able to provide
2. rescue, resuscitation, medical treatment, first aid or
succor of any kind
3. to a person urgently in need of it and whose life may
be endangered if it is not provided
4. callously fails to do so. 32
The Court explained each element. Element one contains
three particular essentials: (1) adequate mental and physical ca-
24. See id. Kearney J. observes:
In short, the common law countries have not as yet introduced a more general
offence of "failing to rescue", on the basis that it is both unnecessary and un-
workable. Hence the path-breaking nature of the Code § 155: in a jurisdiction
whose legal system is based on Australian common law concepts and approaches
there now exists an offence otherwise to be found only in jurisdictions based on
the civil law. Its basis lies in a concept of social responsibility: where another's
life is endangered, it is seen that a person is socially and legally responsible to
take such steps as he is able to avert that result, even though the endangered
person is a stranger to him, and he had nothing to do with creating the danger-
ous situation.
Id. Note that while Kearney J.'s observations are largely true, other common law juris-
dictions, particularly those in the United States, do have Good Samaritan laws. Perhaps
more than anything, this illustrates these statutes' low notoriety.
25 See iii
26. See id. at 160-61.
27. See id. at 161.
28. Id. at 161.
29. See id. at 150.
30. See id
31. See id. at 153.
32- Id. at 160 (emphasis added).
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pacity to assist; (2) some amount of "physical proximity" between
the defendant and the victim (either in presence, or by means of
communication); and (3) knowledge by the defendant that the vic-
tim needs attention. 33 Alone, these elements appear quite inclu-
sive and easily satisfied in application.
Personal action or notification of authorities on the part of the
defendant in assisting the victim satisfies element two.34 Element
three requires that the defendant assist if the victim has a possibly
life-threatening injury.35 Element four, however, restrains the
broad nature of the previous three elements. The term "callous"
in element four requires that there be "more than normal" in-
tent.36 Additionally, this heightened intent is measured subjec-
tively and must be proved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable
doubt.37 Therefore, this element tempers what otherwise might be
an overly extensive assemblage of culpable offenders.
38
Salmon v. Chute is relevant to this Comment for a couple of
reasons. It is the first case in which the Supreme Court of the
Northern Territory dealt with Code section 155. Thus, the Court's
approach offers a stare decisis prediction of how further applica-
tions of Code section 155 may be analyzed. Moreover, it illustrates
how rarely Code section 155 applies. Salmon v. Chute is the sole
appellate-level challenge to the Northern Territory's failure to res-
cue provision.39
B. United States
While there is a general absence of Good Samaritan statutes
in the common law jurisdictions of the United States, a duty to as-
sist can be found in a few states. 4° For example, Minnesota, Ver-
33. See id. at 161.
34. See id. at 162.
35. See id. at 163.
36. Id. at 165.
37. See id. at 167.
38. Although the defendant allegedly caused the victim's injury which led to the vic-
tim's death, it is important to reiterate that section 155 does not require that the accused
cause the harm to trigger section 155. Accordingly, had the defendant been a mere pas-
serby at the scene, section 155 would require a general duty to assist.
39. Salmon v. Chute was decided over one decade after section 155 became law in the
Northern Territory.
40. Subsequent to Princess Diana's death, several publications inaccurately claimed
that the United States has no general duty to assist laws. Minnesota and Vermont employ
Good Samaritan statutes comprising a general duty to assist. See Gloria Allred & Lisa
Bloom, We All Have a Duty to Help One Another, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1997, at M5. All-
[Vol. 20:591596
1998] Good Samaritan 597
mont, and Wisconsin utilize them. Each state, however, employs a
slightly different variation emphasizing distinct qualifications for
accountability under the law.
The statutes, however, share several common factors. For ex-
ample, there is little evidence of enforcement of these statutes,
which creates uncertainty about their application. In addition, a
caveat in each statute excuses a potential rescuer from rendering
assistance if doing so would expose the rescuer to harm. Moreo-
ver, these statutes reject altogether the common law aversion to-
wards the imposition of a duty to assist.
1. Minnesota
Section 604A.01 of the Minnesota Statutes codifies the Min-
nesota Good Samaritan law.41 As one reporter comments, "In
Minnesota there have been no known arrests or prosecutions under
the provision since its inception in 1983, causing some to question
its usefulness." 42 Accordingly, Minnesota lacks case law address-
ing the Good Samaritan law. Nevertheless, while it is difficult to
forecast how the statute might work in practice, it is possible to
make some general observations.
First, the statute applies to a broad scope of persons under the
law.43 Next, the statute requires that the potential rescuer con-
red and Bloom incorrectly state the following: "[I]n the United States, there is no civil or
criminal law requiring a bystander to come to the aid of another. If the accident had oc-
curred in the United States, the paparazzi could not have been charged with violating any
law as a result of photographing rather than assisting." Id. (emphasis added). Had the
unfortunate event ensued in Minnesota or Vermont, the photographers would have been
under a duty to render aid; see also Wendy R. Leibowitz, U.S. Lawyers Puzzled by Laws
in Diana Case, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 15, 1997, at A6 (stating inaccurately that "French Good
Samaritan laws impose a duty to aid someone in distress; ours don't.").
41. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01 (West 1997). The statute reads in part:
Subdivision 1. Duty to assist. A person at the scene of an emergency who
knows that another person is exposed to or has suffered grave physical harm
shall, to the extent that the person can do so without danger or peril to self or
others, give reasonable assistance to the exposed person. Reasonable assistance
may include obtaining or attempting to obtain aid from law enforcement or
medical personnel. A person who violates this subdivision is guilty of a petty
misdemeanor.
Id
42 See Allie Shah, How Good is "Good Samaritan" Legislation? It's Hard to En-
force Lending Helping Hand, STAR-TRIBUNE (Mpls.-St. Paul) Sept. 18, 1997, at lB
(emphasis added).
43. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01 (West 1997). "Person" is defined in the follow-
ing manner:
Subdivision 2. General immunity from liability .... (c) For the purposes of this
section, "person" includes a public or private nonprofit volunteer firefighter,
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sider the harm that has befallen or will befall the victim while also
ascertaining whether, in the rescuer's judgment, the harm exacted
is of a serious nature. Also, the rescuer seems to be absolved of a
duty if aiding would subject the rescuer or others to danger. Last,
although it seems that physically aiding the victim is desired, noti-
fying the authorities suffices under the statute.
In the absence of judicial clarification, the statute leaves many
questions unanswered. 44 For example, it is unclear whether the
"danger to self or others" exception is determined subjectively or
objectively. The result affects the scope of the statute by allowing
a potential rescuer to decide the level of involvement in a rescue.
A subjective view might allow such discretion as to render the
statute effectively unenforceable despite the "reasonableness"
qualification.
2. Vermont
Enacted in the late 1960s, the Vermont Good Samaritan stat-
ute45 was the first statute of its type enacted in a U. S. jurisdic-
tion.46 It is known as the Duty to Aid the Endangered Act.4 7
volunteer police officer, volunteer ambulance attendant, volunteer first provider
of emergency medical services, volunteer ski patroller, and any partnership, cor-
poration, association, or other entity.
Id (emphasis added to illustrate the encompassing nature of the definition of "person").
44. The Court of Appeals of Minnesota offered insight into the precursor of section
604A.01 in a civil matter before the court. See Tiedman v. Morgan, 435 N.W.2d 86, 88-89
(1989). Therein the court said:
Recognizing the absence of a Good Samaritan duty, the Minnesota Legislature
first addressed the topic with a declaration of immunity for those who volunteer
to render emergency care. Minn. Stat. § 604.05 (1971) (enacted by 1971 Minn.
Laws ch. 218, § 1). The declaration of immunity was later accompanied by a
statutory duty to volunteer reasonable assistance. Minn. Stat. § 604.05, subd. 1
(1984) (enacted by 1983 Minn. Laws ch. 319, § 1). It is evident to us that these
enactments deal with the historic Good Samaritan law topic of volunteering as-
sistance to one with whom a person has no special relationship. Until modified
in 1983, no duty to volunteer assistance existed. This statutory duty contrasts
markedly with established common law duties, such as the duty recognized in
Minnesota since Depue [19071.
Id.
45. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (West 1996).
46. See Marc A. Franklin, Vermont Requires Rescue: A Comment, 25 STAN. L. REV.
51,55 (1972).
47. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519, which reads in relevant part:
(a) A person who knows that another is exposed to grave physical harm shall, to
the extent that the same can be rendered without danger or peril to himself or
without interference with important duties owed to others, give reasonable assis-
tance to the exposed person unless that assistance or care is being provided by
others.
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The Supreme Court of Vermont has interpreted Vermont's
Good Samaritan statute on only one occasion. 48 In State v.
Joyce,49 the court refused to require a duty to "intervene in a
fight" congruent with the statutory exception that the rescuer not
be exposed to danger or peril while rescuing the victim. 50 In doing
so, the court affected a strict interpretation of the narrow confines
inherent in the statute.
As the lack of case law indicates, Vermont's Good Samaritan
statute is seldom utilized. Although unclear, the record does indi-
cate that a successful prosecution for violation of the statute has
not occurred. 51 Confusion surrounding whether the statute is civil
or criminal in nature might explain its rare utilization. 52 Regard-
less, the words of one commentator written soon after the passage
of the statute remain germane: "On paper, at least, Vermont has
made history, but the statute's practical effect remains to be
seen."53
3. Wisconsin
Since the mid 1980s Wisconsin residents have been under a
duty to assist.54 Wisconsin's statute differs from other jurisdic-
(c) A person who willfully violates subsection (a) of this section shall be fined
not more than $100.00.
Id.
48. See State v. Joyce, 139 Vt. 638 (1981).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 641.
51. See Lon T. McClintock, Duty to Aid the Endangered Act. the Impact and Potential
of the Vermont Approach, 7 VT. L. REV. 143, 160 (1982).
52. See id. at 144.
The unique character of the Vermont approach is a blend of a civil exemption
with a criminal penalty. Both characteristics are intended to promote the altru-
istic purposes of the statute. In analyzing the scope and application of Section
519, commentators have differed upon which characteristic is more important in
achieving the statute's legislative objective.
Id. But see Franklin, supra note 46, at 55-57.
53. Franklin, supra note 46, at 61.
54. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.34 (West 1997). The relevant part states:
(2)(a) Any person who knows that a crime is being committed and that a victim
is exposed to bodily harm shall summon law enforcement officers or other assis-
tance or shall provide assistance to the victim.
(d) A person need not comply with this subsection if any of the following apply:
1. Compliance would place him or her in danger.
2. Compliance would interfere with duties the person owes to others.
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tions' statutes because it creates only a duty to report a crime or
aid a victim of a crime." The statute does not impose a general
duty to assist; it does not obligate one to assist an accident victim
where there is no criminal act.
The Wisconsin Good Samaritan statute is limited by addi-
tional constraints. It contains several broad exceptions absolving a
potential rescuer of the duty if: (1) assistance renders the rescuer
in danger; (2) other duties supersede the duty to the victim; or (3)
if aid or calls for assistance have been rendered by others. 56 Be-
cause these exceptions seemingly create large loopholes, only a
narrow thread of culpability is woven throughout the jurisdiction.
As in other jurisdictions, Wisconsin's Good Samaritan statute
is infrequently applied. In State v. LaPlante,57 the court upheld the
first known conviction under Wisconsin's Good Samaritan stat-
ute.58 LaPlante involved an attack on a partygoer conducted with
the knowledge of LaPlante, the host of the party.59 Although not
among those who physically inflicted the injury, the court charged
and convicted LaPlante under the Good Samaritan law for failing
to offer aid or summon help after having prior knowledge of the
attack and witnessing it.60 This was the first instance the statute
was used in its then eight year history. 61
On appeal, LaPlante claimed the statute was unconstitu-
tional. 62 LaPlante argued the law, as written, did not create clearly
ascertainable standards of guilt, making the statute unconstitu-
tionally vague. 63 LaPlante believed the statute's language raised
the following questions:
(1) What is the level of knowledge required to impose a duty to
aid; (2) Does the underlying crime have to have been reported
to appropriate law enforcement authorities in order for the
duty to report to attach; (3) Does the person witnessing the
3. In the circumstances described under par. (a), assistance is being sum-




57. See State v. LaPlante, 186 Wis. 2d 427 (1994).
58. See Daley, supra note 4.
59. See LaPlante, 186 Wis. 2d at 430-31.
60. See id. at 431.
61. See Daley, supra note 4.
62. See LaPlante, 186 Wis. 2d at 431.
63. See id. at 433.
[Vol. 20:591600
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crime actually have to believe that a crime was being commit-
ted; (4) What is the nature of the four exceptions listed in §
940.34(2)(d)(1-4), STATS.; (5) Does the duty to report attach
only while the crime is being committed and not afterwards;
and (6) When does a person become a victim?64
The court addressed these assertions. Regarding the first and
third arguments, the court determined the state had the burden of
proof to convince the finder of fact that the defendant "believed a
crime was being committed and that the victim was exposed to
bodily harm."' 65  The court rejected the second argument
(questioning whether the underlying crime had to be reported be-
fore the duty to report attached) as rarely plausible and simply
"absurd. ' 66 In the fourth argument, the court placed the burden of
proof on the defendant to prove whether an exception applies. 67
The court did not address argument five because LaPlante was
present when the attack occurred and thus was within the
"prohibited zone of the statute. '68 Finally, the court addressed ar-
gument six by stating that "if a person believes a crime is being
committed, then, by definition, the person must necessarily also
believe there is a victim of that crime."'69
While the court's analysis of the Wisconsin Good Samaritan
statute is clear, the impact of the LaPlante decision is not. It is
striking to note that even though the court upheld the statute and
affirmed LaPlante's conviction, Wisconsin's Good Samaritan law
remains largely unused.70
C. France
France, like its civil law continental neighbors, has codified a
71Good Samaritan statute. It imposes a general duty to assist, re-
64. Id. at 433 (citation omitted).
65. Id. at 434.
66. Id.
67. See id. at 435.
68. Id. at 435-36.
69. Id. at 436.
70. See Daley, supra note 4.
71. Article 63 reads:
Art. 63 (L. n' 54-411 du 13 avr. 1954) << Sans prdjudice de I'application, le cas
dchdant, des peines plus fortes prdvues par le prdsent code et les lois spciales,
sera puni d'un emprisonnement de trois mois A cinq ans >> (Ord. n' 45-1391 du
25 juin 1945) et d'une amende de 360 F A 20 000 F, ou de l'une de ces deux
peines seulement, quiconque, pouvant empecher par son action immediate, sans
risque pour lui ou pour les tiers, soit un fait qualifid crime, soit un ddlit contre
19981
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quiring no special relationship between the victim and potential
rescuer.72 For clarity, the statute may be divided into several ele-
ments. The law requires that the rescuer be capable of assisting
the victim; 73 that the rescuer subjectively believe the victim is in
danger;74 and that the assistance expose neither the victim nor the
rescuer to danger.75 Furthermore, if a potential rescuer caused the
mishap, the rescuer has a duty to free the victim from danger.76
French law requires that the victim must in fact be in danger
for assistance to be legally required. 77 Stated another way, the
French courts require "that the danger be 'real.' The opposite to
real danger is not possible danger, but presumed danger. ' 78 As a
component of this requirement, "French courts have elaborated
the requirement that the danger must necessitate immediate inter-
ference."' 79 It appears, therefore, that timeliness serves to narrow
culpability under Article 63.
The law's requirements of imminent and actual danger nar-
l'int6gritd corporelle de la personne, s'abstient volontairement de la faire.
Sera puni des memes peines quiconque s'abstient volontairement de porter A
une personne en p6ril l'assistance que, sans risque pour lui ni pour les tiers, il
pouvait lui preter, soit par son action personnelle, soit en provoquant un secours.
Sera puni des m~mes peines celui qui, connaissant la preuve de l'innocence
d'une personne incarc~re provisoirement ou jugde pour crime ou drlit,
s'abstient volontairement d'en apporter aussit6t le trmoignage aux autoritrs de
justice ou de police. Toutefois, aucune peine ne sera prononcre contre celui qui
apportera son trmoignage tardivement, mais spontan6ment.
Sont exceptds de la disposition de l'alinda prrcddent le coupable du fait qui mo-
tivait la poursuite, ses coauteurs, ses complices et les parents ou allies de ces
personnes jusqu'au quatri~me degr6 inclusivement.
C. PaN. art. 63.
72. See Ashworth & Steiner, supra note 14 at 153, 157.
73. See id. at 157. "Thus the non-swimmer would not commit the offence by failing to
try to rescue personally someone who was drowning, although the non-swimmer would be
expected to do any other acts which were possible, such as summoning help or throwing a
lifebelt." Id
74. See id. at 158.
75. See Feldbrugge, supra note 10, at 644:
Here it is argued that one will always be able to offer some help which will not
bring with it any risk to the helper; only total inaction on the part of the poten-
tial rescuer should lead to criminal liability. The French courts seem to settle for
an intermediate point of view: where the help which is being offered exceeds a
certain measure of inadequacy, criminal liability sets in.
76. See Ashworth & Steiner, supra note 14, at 157. "Thus the Criminal Chamber of
the Court of Cassation held in 1980 that a conviction for intentional wounding of a person
who runs away after the offence, leaving the victim unattended, does not necessarily pre-
vent an additional conviction under article 63 (2)." Id.
77. See id. at 158.
78. Feldbrugge, supra note 10, at 632-33.
79. Id. at 634.
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row culpability. Thus, enforcement has generally been limited to
distinct areas such as, "motorists who fail to assist accident victims,
doctors who fail to assist sick or injured people, parents who for
religious reasons fail to call help for their sick children, healers
who fail to advise people to take expert medical advice, and peo-
ple who assist others to commit suicide."' 80 Scant numbers of re-
cent cases, however, indicate a shift away from the law's enforce-
ment, coinciding with the French population's possible
unawareness of their general duty to assist.8
1
IV. THE DESIRABILITY OF GOOD SAMARITAN STATUTES
A. Good Samaritan Laws Are Undesirable
Many critics question the merits of a general duty to assist.
Some center upon theoretical skepticism, while others warn of the
practical problems associated with Good Samaritan laws.82 In
common law jurisdictions, the theoretical problems have been
summarized in the following manner:
Four major theoretical arguments have been raised in the legal
literature against the duty to rescue. One asserts that omissions
cannot give rise to liability because they do not cause harm.
Another asserts that all non-contractual positive duties the state
imposes are illegitimate. A third asserts that the duty to rescue
is a type of forced altruism and that forced altruism is wrong.
And the fourth holds that the duty to rescue imposes an undue
burden on individual liberty.83
80. Ashworth & Steiner, supra note 72, at 158.
81. See Laying Down the Law, September 3, 1997, Newshour Transcript (visited Nov.
6, 1997) <http://www.pbs.org/newshourlbb/law/july-dec97/french_9-3.html>. In a tran-
script from the PBS television program Newshour, Phil Ponce leads a query into the dif-
ferences between French and U.S. criminal law. While questioning "Laurent Vonder-
weidt, a French citizen who is certified to practice law in both the United States and
France," Ponce asks if the Good Samaritan duty is "an obligation that French citizens are
generally aware of, their responsibility to help out?" to which Vonderweidt replies
"That's a question that may be difficult to answer, but I do not believe that, indeed, peo-
ple are aware of this, this provision of the law, so that's pretty much what I can say.
Again, I'm not sure they are aware of that. Now I'm sure they are." This illustrates the
confusion surrounding the general duty to assist in France-a duty that has existed in
some form since World War II. See id.
82. See Larry C. Wilson, The Defence of Others-Criminal Law and the Good Sa-
maritan, 33 MCGILL L.J. 756, 811 (1988).
83. I (quoting M.K. Osbeck, Bad Samaritanism and the Duty to Render Aid- A
Proposal, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 315, 328 (1985)). But see LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra
note 19, at 296.
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These theoretical objections remain controversial after Princess
Diana's death.84 Most of these arguments focus on the importance
placed on individual rights in the United States-rights that alleg-
edly have no parallel in France.
85
Practical concerns also restrain application of Good Samari-
tan statutes. For example, it may be difficult for potential rescuers
to know whether they are required by law to intervene. 86 And fur-
ther, even if the rescuer is required to intervene, it may be tough to
determine when the general duty to assist ends. Commentators
ask, for example, "[W]ould this obligation include a duty to give
money on demand to starving beggars?" 87 An additional concern
is the fear of selective prosecution, resulting from the inherent dif-
ficulty of knowing exactly who witnessed a perilous situation and
did not assist.88
Another argument against a general duty to assist involves the
potential sinister abuse of such a duty where false injuries are
Finally, the point is made that, despite frequent avowals to the contrary, we
really do not view death-causing omissions in the same way as death-causing
acts, so that what is in fact a distinction on moral grounds is appropriately also a
distinction in the criminal law. However, this does not necessarily mean that
omissions outside existing legal duty categories should be ignored by the crimi-
nal law; it may only mean that such omissions should be subject to lesser sanc-
tions than those provided for acts which bring the same results.... Some of the
European "Good Samaritan laws" operate in this way, and similar legislation
has been adopted in a few states.
Id.
84. See Sheldon Richman, You Can't Legislate Goodwill, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Oct. 2, 1997, at 19. "America was founded on a bedrock of inalienable indi-
vidual rights. Under that theory, each person is the owner of his life and has no positive
legal obligations to others that are enforceable by government except those that are vol-
untarily accepted." Id. As far as the forced altruism argument is concerned, Richman
states, "People might find Good Samaritan laws reasonable because they believe people
of good will should help others in distress. But where individual rights are respected and
government power is limited, good will cannot be enshrined in the law. It would under-
mine freedom." Id.
85. See Samaritans by Choice, DENVER POST, Sept. 22, 1997, at B6. "America's legal
system, based on English common law, strongly protects individuals' rights and imposes
no duty on them to help out unless they choose to." Id.; see also Anne Cucchiara Besser
& Kalman J. Kaplan, The Good Samaritan: Jewish and American Legal Perspectives, 10
J.L. & RELIGION 193, 196 (1993-94). "As a result of this stress upon individual freedoms
and fear of governmental oppression, western law as a general rule does not impose liabil-
•ity on the failure to act to help another person, leaving such decisions to individual con-
science." Id.
86. See Wilson, supra note 82, at 811; see also Laying Down the Law, supra note 81.
87. Wilson, supra note 82, at 811; see also LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 19, at 295.
8& See Wilson, supra note 82, at 811-12 (Mark K. Osbeck, Bad Samaritanism and the
Duty to Render Aid: A Proposal, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 315, 336-42 (1985).)
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feigned to lure good-intentioned rescuers. 89 This typically involves
the following hypothetical situation: A passerby under the obliga-
tion of a Good Samaritan law happens upon a stranger apparently
in need of medical assistance. After approaching the supposed
victim in an attempt to render aid, the Good Samaritan is robbed
or violently attacked by the "victim." Essentially, the Good Sa-
maritan becomes the target, or victim of crime while acting in ac-
cordance with the law.90
Perhaps the most obvious practical argument against Good
Samaritan laws is the cost associated with their enforcement. The
capital needed to investigate, arrest, and adjudicate violators of
these laws could reach exorbitant amounts. This problem becomes
apparent when examining the plausibility of enacting a duty to as-
sist in states currently without such laws.91 Also, when the over-
whelming cost associated with prosecuting violators of Good Sa-
maritan laws is weighed against the ill that such laws are meant to
curtail, it is not surprising that these laws are rarely enforced in
those jurisdictions which employ them. Arguably, the resources
saved by not enacting Good Samaritan laws would result in the
prosecution of offenders of more serious crimes instead of viola-
tors of a general duty to assist.92
B. Good Samaritan Laws Are Desirable
A fervent sentiment among some commentators extols the
positive aspects of Good Samaritan laws. In the aftermath of the
Princess Diana tragedy, these beliefs remain vigilant. Two general
themes emerge-punishment and moral posture.
Being criminal statutes, Good Samaritan laws exact punish-
ment for socially unacceptable behavior. As one commentator
89. See id. at 812; see also Sjoerdsma, supra note 18, at A9.
90. While this situation is deplorable, an argument can be made that it exemplifies
the need for Good Samaritan legislation. Suppose a jurisdiction does not require a gen-
eral duty to assist. A rescuer, acting out of individual moral discretion becomes the target
of a feigning victim. Who would rescue the rescuer? In the absence of a Good Samaritan
law, the discretion falls wholly on the passerby. Under a Good Samaritan law, the argu-
ment is that the likelihood of rescue is increased.
91. See Hynes, supra note 4. In Hynes's interview with Clark County, Nevada's As-
sistant District Attorney J. Charles Thompson, Thompson states, "We would need a
whole new district attorney's office to prosecute those people who don't report crimes."
I
92. See Shah, supra note 42. Shah interviews Nicollet County, Minnesota attorney
Michael Riley who says, "prosecutors tend to pursue the strongest charges against an of-
fender." Id
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states, "the desirability of at least punishing behavior that is outra-
geous in this regard has also been endorsed by Anglo-American
lawyers. The practice of the courts in applying a failure-to-rescue
provision shows clearly that it is precisely against outrageous be-
havior that these provisions are employed. ' 93 While this is true in
France, the same cannot be said for Good Samaritan jurisdictions
within the United States and Australia.
The problem is that Good Samaritan laws in Minnesota, Wis-
consin, Vermont, and the Northern Territory are largely dormant.
Accordingly, they punish nothing. This indicates either lack of en-
forcement of, or the need for such laws. Unfortunately, in the ab-
sence of an extremely moral or law-abiding public, the former is
the more likely reason.94 Justification, however, still exists for
Good Samaritan laws beyond purposes of punishment.
Criminal law, and Good Samaritan laws in particular, serve a
higher purpose apart from concerns of mere punishment.95 These
laws provide some sort of "moral compass" that points society in
its proper direction. 96
Nowhere is this argument more relevant than in Minnesota.
As mentioned in Part III.B.1, Minnesota's Good Samaritan statute
has been fallow since its enactment in 1983. 97 An original sponsor
of the bill indicates that its purpose was largely symbolic, conso-
nant with Minnesota's vision of an ideal society.98 Regardless, the
message is clear; what at first glance appears to be lack of en-
forcement might actually be manifestation of legislative intent.99
A similar situation exists in Wisconsin. In a newspaper article
printed soon after Princess Diana's death, a representative from
93. Feldbrugge, supra note 10, at 654.
94. See Shah, supra note 42; Franklin, supra note 46, at 61; Daley, supra note 4.
95. See Feldbrugge, supra note 10, at 653-54.
96. See Glendon, supra note 12. Glendon declares:
The social effects of such legislation cannot be expected to be direct, or immedi-
ate, or dramatic .... Whether meant to be or not, law, in heterogeneous socie-
ties where it is pervasive, is regarded by many citizens as a principal carrier of
the few common values that are widely shared. Under such circumstances, even
the silences of the law can sometimes speak.
Id.
97. See Shah, supra note 42.
98. See id. (quoting United States Representative Bill Luther, D-Minn., who explains
the purpose of the statute.).
99. But see id. "Former DFL Rep. Randy Staten, who sponsored the bill in the Min-




the attorney general's office stated that little inquiry has been
made concerning the Wisconsin Good Samaritan statute since its
enactment in 1983.100 Further, "[ilt's not the kind of issue that we
heard a lot about before last Saturday night,"''M and "[w]hile it
might be a little rosy-eyed to say this, I think the good people of
Wisconsin generally aid victims when they see them in trouble."'102
Whether the statute compels residents of Wisconsin to assist those
in danger is pure speculation. 103 Nevertheless, one could suggest
that Wisconsin's Good Samaritan law is an instrument of moral
guidance either by legislative purpose or chance.
C. Good Samaritan Laws-A Prescription of Ineffectiveness for
Further United States' Jurisdictions
In the aftermath of the Princess Diana tragedy, discussion sur-
rounds heeding the French example by enacting similar Good Sa-
maritan provisions in the United States.104 Such a "push" for ad-
ditional legislation in the United States should be reconsidered for
a variety of reasons.
The prevailing argument is that the good offered by imposing
a general duty to assist is outweighed by its encroachment on in-
dividual liberty and freedom. 105 While this argument is meritori-
ous, it ignores that several common law jurisdictions already have
Good Samaritan laws that display no glaring deprivation in these
areas. 10 6 Accordingly, this argument amounts to no more than a
fear-based hypothesis.
An argument based on practical experience is far more valid.
By way of example, the Northern Territory, Minnesota, Vermont,
and Wisconsin, all common law jurisdictions, demonstrate they are
100. See Daley, supra note 4 (relaying information from Wisconsin Attorney General
Jim Doyle's director of research and information, James Haney).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. If not, there would have been little need for the Good Samaritan statute in the
first place.
104. See Lapps, supra note 4. "Now, in the aftermath of Princess Di's death, I have
found something about France to truly admire, and the only thing French I think we
should imitate-their Good Samaritan law whereby it is against the law not to stop and
help an accident victim." id.
105. See Richman, supra note 84.
106. Note that these concerns could be problematic under existing Good Samaritan
laws if they were applied. Their neglect in Australia and the United States has occa-
sioned only a couple of constitutional challenges. No statute has been deemed unconsti-
tutional.
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ill at ease with enforcing duties to assist. While this alone should
not serve to proscribe further provisions, it is a truism that cannot
be ignored. As stated earlier, common law countries such as Aus-
tralia and the United States are less inclined to enact Good Sa-
maritan laws than civil law countries such as France. Furthermore,
common law jurisdictions are less inclined to enforce such laws
should they exist, nullifying any punishment a statute might exact.
Criminal law punishes wrongs and gives moral direction. Be-
cause punishment is not served through the use of these statutes in
common law jurisdictions, they exist only as moral compasses.
This raises a pertinent question: is new Good Samaritan legisla-
tion justified in creating symbolic statutes that effect little sub-
stance?
To many, the answer is "yes.' 10 7 This, however, accomplishes
little. It is indisputable that the paparazzi acted reprehensibly by
snapping photographs of Princess Diana and her companions in-
stead of assisting them on that fateful August night.108 It would be
unwise, however, to enact Good Samaritan laws out of impulse-
especially when they would amount to ineffective symbolism. An
argument could be made, nonetheless, that new Good Samaritan
statutes that actually punish can be enacted in the United States.
Such an argument befuddles the history of Good Samaritan
laws in the United States. Princess Diana's death is not the first
tragedy of its kind to incite outrage toward malevolent conduct.
The Catherine Genovese murder 109 encouraged Vermont to enact
its Good Samaritan law in 1967. The New Bedford rape inci-
dent" 0 motivated similar action in Massachusetts. Both examples
are certainly as vile as the Princess Diana incident because all in-
volve 6xtreme examples of what many consider base moral con-
107. See Daniel B. Yeager, A Radical Community of Aid- A Rejoinder to Opponents
of Affirmative Duties to Help Strangers, 71 WASH. U.L.Q. 1, 34 & n.160 (offering reasons
why symbolic statutes are valuable).
108. See Bremner & Pierce, supra note 4. "Photographers are said to have spent up to
ten minutes taking pictures of the dead and dying before the emergency services were
called and witnesses reported that some were still swarming around the wreckage when
the police arrived." Id.
109. See Heyman, supra note 15, at 677 & n.16. "In 1964, Catherine Genovese was
stabbed to death over a half-hour period in the Kew Gardens section of New York City
while neighbors watched from the safety of their apartments. Despite her screams and
pleas for help, no one called the police during the assault." Id.
110. See Yeager, supra note 107, at 21. "In 1983, six patrons of 'Big Dan's,' a New
Bedford, Massachusetts bar, raped and sodomized a twenty-two-year-old mother of two




Nevertheless, these noteworthy incidents and their resulting
laws rest nearly forgotten. So, while commentators pine for more
Good Samaritan laws, history affords the knowledge that they will
be ineffective. The hope that humankind's latest brush with "Bad
Samaritanism" will spawn new statutes that yield different results
is unsupported by the experience of all relevant common law ju-
risdictions.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the public is rightly disgusted by the disinclination
of the paparazzi to aid Princess Diana and her companions, the
implementation of further Good Samaritan laws in the United
States would be wholly symbolic. The common law aversion to-
wards a general duty to assist has no counterpart in France or
other civil law jurisdictions. Thus, the urge to emulate the French
Good Samaritan law is untenable.
Furthermore, enacting legislation like in the Northern Terri-
tory of Australia, Minnesota, Vermont, and Wisconsin is an exer-
cise in futility. These jurisdictions effectively disavow any mean-
ingful purpose behind their duties to assist by largely relying on
them as symbols of moral bearing only. What remains is no more
effective than the Good Samaritan parable in the Bible itself. We
do not need that lesson recapitulated to know right from wrong.
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APPENDIX
EFFECTS AND REQUIREMENTS OF A GENERAL DUTY TO ASSIST
Australia United States France
General Duty No, except No, except Yes2
to Assist Northern Minnesota,
Territory Vermont, and
Wisconsin1
System of Law Common Law Common Law3  Civil Law
Rescuer Required Minnesota- Required
Must Possess unclear, but
Adequate likely yes;
Mental and Vermont- unclear,




Physical Required Minnesota- Required
Proximity required-4
Between Vermont-no;5
Rescuer and Wisconsin-no 6
Victim






Personal Action Not Required 10 Minnesota-not Required







EFFECTS AND REQUIREMENTS OF A GENERAL DUTY TO ASSIST
Australia United States France










Victims Injury Yes Minnesota-yes; 20  Yes
Must be of a
Life- Vermont-yes; 21
Threatening
Nature to Wisconsin-no 22
Require that
Rescuer Assist
Callous Intent Required Minnesota-no;23  No








Absolves Duty Wisconsin-yes 28
Punishment for Up to 7 years Minnesota-petty From 3
Failing to Assist misdemeanor; months to
Vermont-fine up 5 years or
to $100;29 fine of
Wisconsin- "30 360-
days in jail and 20,000
a $500 fine"
30  francs
1. Wisconsin requires less than a general duty to assist. See generally WiS. STAT.
ANN. § 940.34 (West 1997).
2. See C. P-N. art. 63 (Fr.).
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3. All states except Louisiana.
4. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01 (West 1997). "A person at the scene of an
emergency .... " Id. (emphasis added).
5. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (West 1996). Unlike Minnesota law, which
requires the rescuer to be "at the scene of an emergency," the Vermont statute only
requires a person to have knowledge "that another is exposed... to harm." Id.; see also
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01 (West 1997).
6. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.34(2)(a) (West 1997). The Wisconsin statute requires
only that someone "knows that a crime is being committed." Id
7. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01 (West 1997). The Minnesota statute states, "[a]
person... who knows that another person is exposed to or has suffered grave physical
harm." Id (emphasis added).
8. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (West 1996). The Vermont statute states, "[a]
person who knows... shall... give reasonable assistance." Id. (emphasis added).
9. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.34 (West 1997). The Wisconsin statute requires,
"[alny person who knows... that a victim is exposed to bodily harm." Id
10. Not required if rescuer properly notifies authorities.
11. Not required if rescuer properly notifies authorities. See MINN. STAT. ANN. §
604A.01 (West 1997). The Minnesota statute states that "[r]easonable assistance may
include obtaining or attempting to obtain aid from law enforcement or medical
personnel." Id.
12. Not required if other rescuers are providing care or assistance, if danger to self or
others arises, or if there is "interference with important duties owed to others." See VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (West 1996).
13. Not required if others provide or summon assistance, other duties supersede that
to the victim, or if aiding would place the rescuer in danger. See WIS. STAT. ANN. §
940.34(2)(d) (West 1997).
14. See Andrew Ashworth & Eva Steiner, Criminal Omissions and Public Duties: the
French Experience, 10 LEGAL STUD. 153, 159 (1990). "The extent of the duty in each
case is an objective question for the court rather than a subjective matter for the
defendant alone." Id.
15. Not required if rescuer takes personal action to render assistance.
16. It is not required, however, if rescuer takes personal action to render assistance.
See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01 (West 1997). "Reasonable assistance may include
obtaining or attempting to obtain aid from law enforcement or medical personnel." Id.
(emphasis added).
17. See generally VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (West 1996). Although not expressly
required, a duty to notify authorities would, in some circumstances, likely provide the
"reasonable assistance" obligated by the statute. See id.
18. It is not required, however, if rescuer takes personal action to render assistance or
if others seek help. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.34(2)(a) (West 1997).
19. Ashworth & Steiner, supra note 14, at 159. "The extent of the duty in each case is
an objective question for the court rather than a subjective matter for the defendant
alone." Id.
20. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01 (West 1997). The Minnesota statute requires
"grave physical harm." Id.
21. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (West 1996). The Vermont statute requires
"grave physical harm." Id.
22. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.34 (West 1997). The Wisconsin statute states, "[a]ny
person who knows... that a victim is exposed to bodily harm." Id.
23. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01 (West 1997). Callousness does not seem to be a
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requirement, although it may be presumed that offering "reasonable assistance" does not
allow callous disregard. See generally id.
24. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (West 1996). Callousness does not seem to be a
requirement, although it may be presumed that offering "reasonable assistance" does not
allow callous disregard. See generally id
25. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.34 (West 1997). There is no language in the statute
that seems to necessitate evil intent for a conviction. See id.
26. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01 (West 1997). The Minnesota statute requires
this "to the extent that the person can do so without danger or peril to self or others." Id.
27. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(a) (West 1996) ("[T]o the extent that the same
can be rendered without danger or peril to himself or without interference with important
duties owed to others.").
28. "A person need not comply with this subsection if... 1. Compliance would place
him or her in danger, [or] 2. Compliance would interfere with duties the person owes to
others." WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.34(2)(d) (West 1997).
29. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(c) (West 1996).
30. Few 'Good Samaritan' Laws in America, September 5, 1997, THE ASSOCIATED
PRESS (visited Nov. 6, 1997) <http:llwww.sltrib.com/97/sep/090597/nation_w/2594.htm>.

